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Research shows vendors manipulate open standards for physical products such as routers and switches to introduce positive 
switching costs. This article explores the possibility of manipulating vertical standards, purely abstract compatibility 
standards based on the eXtensible Markup Language (XML). Vertical standards use XML to formalize and codify business 
processes and data formats unique to specific industries. Manipulating vertical standards does not optimize or enhance 
proprietary hardware capabilities since they are not embedded in physical products, and any manipulation is easily detected 
and quite correctable, so it is unclear whether positive switching costs can be introduced by any vendor. This paper describes 
why vertical standards are not immune to manipulation, and explores circumstances which may make the manipulation of 
purely abstract compatibility standards possible. A series of testable propositions are presented, and potential evidence to 
signal the introduction of positive switching costs is discussed. Further research in this area is discussed. 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
Standards are technical specifications for products and services resulting from formal or market-based agreement (David 
1987), and play a major role in the competitive position of a firm (Mitchell 1994). Standards may emerge as the result of 
free-market forces, legislative authority, or through the work of standards-development organizations (SDOs) (Farrell & 
Saloner 1988, David & Greenstein 1990). Information technology (IT) standards can help accelerate integration effects 
between organizations (Malone et al. 1987, Benjamin et al. 1990) and give rise to demand-side network effects (David & 
Greenstein 1990), but can trap an organization with a substandard choice (Farrell & Saloner 1985) and lock companies out of 
markets (Schilling 1998) if not chosen correctly. Adopting a successful standard can mean success in the marketplace, but 
adopting the wrong standard may leave an organization "orphaned" without options for compatibility with the eventual 
winning standard (Besen 1992). Standards facilitate data exchange between systems, increase the pool of suppliers to a firm, 
simplify the purchase process, and lower systems integration costs (Bird 1998).  
Standards that define interface mechanisms for IT products and systems are known as compatibility standards (David 1987), 
and there is evidence to suggest that vendors are able to manipulate compatibility standards for physical IT products to raise 
switching costs for customers (Chen & Forman 2006). This paper explores possible scenarios for the manipulation of abstract 
compatibility standards, specifically vertical standards based on the eXtensible Markup Language (XML), and describes 
conditions which may enable the manipulation of emerging vertical standards by vendors. Manipulation of compatibility in 
physical networking products (switches and routers) has been shown to generate positive switching costs (Chen & Forman 
2006), but it is unclear whether the manipulation of purely abstract compatibility standards would result in positive switching 
costs for the adopting organization. 
VERTICAL STANDARDS 
Vertical standards are abstract compatibility standards that formally describe industry-specific data formats and business 
processes for interorganizational use (Markus et al. 2003). Vertical standards are most often implemented using the 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML), a collection of syntax rules that allows developers to create customized markup tags to 
provide semantic meaning to data. Firms participating in any particular industry develop vocabularies, data dictionaries, and 
data models using consistent definitions and usage guidelines for these tags, which are then used to describe products and 
services, to provide contextual meaning to data, and to exchange data between systems using different formats. The greater  
the complexity of a product or service, the greater the likelihood a firm will obtain that product via hierarchical relationships 
than through market coordination (Malone et al. 1987). Vertical standards help foment hierarchical relationships by enabling 
companies to describe complex products and services to make end-to-end computing possible. Market coordination costs are 
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also reduced through the use of vertical standards, which permits firms to select a few key suppliers from the market at large, 
and develop systems that enable greater interfirm collaboration without the risk of specific investments. 
Despite the interorganizational nature of data exchange for which vertical standards have been created, they also provide 
significant internal benefits to organizations (Knox 2003). Research has documented internal use of vertical standards and 
related technologies for parsing and reformatting data received in multiple formats from various business partners, and for 
use in corporate knowledge management systems (Mendoza & Jahng 2003). Vertical standards technologies have been 
customized or extended by these organizations specifically to provide these services. 
The adoption and diffusion of vertical standards has been slower than expected, and research has uncovered a variety of 
organizational and institutional factors slowing their deployment, including conflicts of interest at the development stage in 
energy markets (Wareham et al. 2005) and financial services (Chang & Jarvenpaa 2005), asymmetrical power in business 
partner relationships in the automotive industry (Gerst & Bunduchi 2005), and vendor manipulation of product features to 
manipulate customer switching costs (Chen & Forman 2006). 
Vulnerability of Vertical Standards to Manipulation 
Vertical standards are context-sensitive interfaces, and are specifically created to address the needs of the industry for which 
they are developed. It is important to remember that, while vertical standards are based on XML, XML itself is a horizontal 
standard, and it is not until an industry-specific application is developed that a standard becomes a “vertical” standard. 
Industry-specific vocabularies, data dictionaries, and data models may be extended as additional functionality is identified, 
and without compromising the compatibility of previous generations of a vertical standard. These extensions can be 
developed using the same procedures that resulted in the development and deployment of the original standard, so there is 
very little risk of incompatibilities with subsequent versions of vertical standards. The modularity and granularity (Benkler 
2002) of vertical standards allows organizations to obtain business benefits from the use of segments of a standard, with the 
option to deploy more of the vertical standard’s functionality as required by emerging business needs, and as this 
functionality is built into the vertical standard. The ability to modularize and layer vertical standard functionality allows 
organizations to obtain positive returns, even in partial-deployment scenarios (Braa et al. 2007). Organizations are free to 
implement any portion of the standard they see as suitable to their needs, and can develop internal converters to facilitate data 
transport between different systems and applications in their environment using the same technologies used to deploy vertical 
standards. 
The vulnerability of vertical standards and related technologies lies precisely in this flexibility. Industry adopters and vendors 
alike are free to develop extensions, converters, and translators using XML to extend the “official” functionality of a vertical 
standard. However, research suggests that market compatibility outcomes are more inefficient in the presence of converters 
than in their absence (Farrell & Saloner 1992). Empirical work shows that vendors are still able to manipulate vertical and 
horizontal compatibility to increase switching costs in the presence of open standards for data routers and switches (Chen & 
Forman 2006). Generally, vendors benefit from increased market demand in the presence of standards, but standards can also 
stiffen competition between undifferentiable products. Vendors may have incentives to extend standards functionality to 
differentiate their products and increase switching costs to maintain a larger customer base. These findings have significant 
implications for the development and diffusion of vertical standards. While the ability to manipulate standards is directly 
applicable to vertical standards, switches and routers are physical products which require product-specific software to offer 
full functionality. Vertical standards, on the other hand, are a purely abstract collection of syntax rules that do not depend on 
any specific hardware platform, and whose functionality cannot be extended unilaterally without deviation from the original 
standard. Since writing XML-based extensions, converters, or adapters does not change the nature of the original vertical 
standard and does not affect compatibility with it, are vertical standards also vulnerable to the same kind of manipulation that 
may increase switching costs for physical products? 
Vertical & Horizontal Compatibility for Vertical Standards 
It is necessary to define what constitutes vertical and horizontal compatibility for vertical standards before embarking on a 
discussion of vulnerability. In the case of routers and switches, horizontal refers to cross-vendor compatibility, and vertical 
compatibility is defined as proprietary extensions that may enhance performance within a single vendor’s product line. Since 
vertical standards are simply a collection of product and service descriptions agreed upon by industry members, not hardware 
or software product lines, vertical compatibility refers to compatibility with business processes and data formats directly 
within the current or planned scope of the vertical standard. Compatibility with these business process and data format 
descriptions is platform- and system-agnostic, so it depends solely on the definition of the business process and data format 
elements that make up the core of what an industry wishes to standardize. Given the dynamic nature of vertical standards this 
scope may, in time, grow to include functionality not originally planned, but the focus of this functionality is always 
interorganizational, platform- and system-agnostic, and externally-focused, with respect to the user organization. Thus, 
modifications that affect vertical compatibility in the context of vertical standards are those which extend the vertical 
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standard to provide functionality that was not planned or anticipated at the time of the modification. These modifications will 
reflect firm-specific business process and data formats, but which would easily be identifiable as being firm-specific when 
first deployed. These modifications are carried out prior to any certainty that the scope of the vertical standard would expand 
to include them at some later point in time, which it may. Thus, vertical compatibility modifications add business processes 
and data formats used externally by the firm but not necessarily shared with other industry members other than its business 
partners. These unique business processes and data formats may be used to support and extend the scope of the firm’s supply 
chain management, order/shipping/billing procedures, or of any business partner-specific systems investment. 
Horizontal compatibility is compatibility with existing systems and applications in use by the organization for internal 
purposes, and whose specific functionality is not intended to be covered by the standard. Horizontal compatibility is 
intraorganizational, platform- and system-dependent, and internally-focused. Modifications that affect the horizontal 
compatibility of vertical standards are those needed to make them work with various platforms, and which necessarily depend 
on the hardware and software combinations that make up each target system. Modifications that affect the horizontal 
compatibility of vertical standards may also be described as middleware, since they specifically seek to translate the vertical 
standard so as to make it compatible with a specific application or system. These modifications do not necessarily alter the 
logical content of the vertical standard, but they do enable firms to create compatibility bridges to legacy applications. Thus, 
these modifications would be developed in-house specifically to support legacy systems, or applications with few direct 
external compatibility options such as ERP software, MRP modules, or CRM systems. 
It is worth summarizing that vertical compatibility of vertical standards may be still, at some point in the future, fall under the 
purview of development of a vertical standard, but that horizontal compatibility is specific to the internal needs of a firm. In 
this fashion, vertical compatibility remains in the context of industry-based compatibility, but horizontal compatibility refers 
only to the internal technical environment and needs of a single firm, and is different from the meaning of a horizontal 
standard that cuts across industries. 
It is reasonable to expect that manipulating either the vertical or horizontal compatibility of vertical standards may increase 
switching costs for the end-user organization, making it more dependent on the expertise of the external supplier providing 
the company with standards-related products and services. This makes it necessary to understand the conditions under which 
such manipulation may take place, and to look for empirical evidence to determine whether this particular scenario is actually 
taking place in vertical standards development efforts. There are multiple definitions for what a switching cost is, but for our 
purposes switching costs are costs introduced ex post to a product and which prevent the buyer from moving to a different 
supplier without having to repeat an initial investment made in the first supplier (Farrell & Klemperer 2006). 
The more a vertical standard is augmented or customized to work within a firm's existing architecture, the more vulnerable 
the organization will become to compatibility manipulation by its suppliers. This customization will generally be completed 
using the same technologies, primarily XML, with which vertical standards are implemented, and may extend the 
functionality of a vertical standard in the direction in which it is intended to develop (vertical compatibility) by adding 
elements that describe business processes and data formats specific to the organization. This leads to the first proposition 
regarding compatibility manipulation 
Proposition 1 - The greater the amount of customization work needed to deploy vertical standards and related technologies in 
an organization, the higher the manipulation risk for vertical compatibility. 
The customization work may also serve to allow a vertical standard to exchange information with existing systems and 
applications via data parsing and reskinning. This work is uniquely dependent on the firm's technical platform on the target 
technology for which compatibility is sought. Thus, 
Proposition 2 - The greater the amount of customization work needed to deploy vertical standards and related technologies in 
an organization, the higher the manipulation risk for horizontal compatibility. 
The effect of these customizations may be to create hard-coded features that remain unique non-standard elements in a 
company's use of vertical standards. The extent to which these non-standard elements generate positive switching costs will 
be moderated by the level of expertise of the organization with vertical standards. Low levels of expertise may delay 
organizational adoption of new technologies (Attewell 1992) and reduce a company's ability to identify and exploit 
opportunities resulting from emerging technologies (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). The following propositions are made 
regarding levels of expertise related to vertical standards 
Proposition 3 - Lower levels of expertise related to vertical standards increase manipulation risks for vertical compatibility of 
vertical standards. 
Proposition 4 - Lower levels of expertise related to vertical standards increase manipulation risks for horizontal compatibility 
of vertical standards. 
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Distinguishing whether the intent of any manipulation of compatibility characteristics is to enhance product features or to 
generate positive switching costs to ensure customer loyalty is an exceedingly difficult task (Chen & Forman 2006). Vendors 
may freely claim that any deviations from an official standard are meant to enhance functionality for users of their products, 
and showing otherwise will be difficult for any organization since either result is "observationally equivalent" (Chen & 
Forman 2006) in their creation of positive switching costs. Since vertical standards are purely abstract sets of syntax rules and 
commonly-agreed definitions, all implemented with relatively simple text-based XML files, accusing vendors of creating 
positive switching costs will be particularly hard. The vendor can claim that a simple XML-based solution may be found to 
eliminate any incompatibilities introduced either by their extensions or by the development of new standard functionality. 
SDOs will be pushed to determine when these manipulations to the vertical standards they sponsor are actually taking place, 
and whether there is a need to publicly identify them as manipulative in nature, or whether they are matters for an 
organization's internal IS resources to determine. Either way, there are potential legal ramifications for an incorrect judgment 
on the nature of any work that deviates from the official version of the vertical standard. It is suggested that 
Proposition 5 - Identifying the intent of any extensions or manipulations to a vertical standard will be as difficult a task as it 
is for physical products. 
Strong intellectual property (IP) rights protection may strengthen the position of a sponsored standard in the market and 
discourage competitors in the same domain (Farrell 1989). Standards-developing organizations with relatively successful 
track records in vertical standards development make strong, clear IP policies a centerpiece of their activities (Rada 1998, 
Steinfield et al. 2004). Vertical standards present a particular problem in this regard because it is easy to avoid IP issues when 
manipulating compatibility for firm-specific applications. Since no deviation from the standard by any organization, end-user 
or vendor, affects the actual logical content of a vertical standard, does not prevent other adopters from deploying the original 
vertical standard in its entirety, unchanged, and the modifications are generally created for internal purposes, identifying any 
modifications that may result in positive switching costs is extremely difficult. Any modification is easy to circumvent with 
relatively simple software development work, and the risk of these manipulations is not necessarily the change itself but the 
level of embeddedness of the change in firm-specific environments, in particular in light of the propositions described earlier. 
Thus, it falls on the organizations adopting any modifications to identify the level of risk they may face. Additionally, SDOs 
lack formal tracking mechanisms for accurately measuring adoption or deployment of their standards (Nelson et al. 2005), 
which complicates the problem of identifying non-standard features that may create problems for individual organizations. 
Thus, IP policies may prevent the fragmentation of development efforts in a single industry and ensure the free use of the 
vertical standard by any SDO member, but it does not prevent supply-side firms from developing firm-specific extensions to 
a vertical standard , these extension may easily steer clear of any IP infringement and are found to be useful to the firm (or 
they would not approve of their introduction into their controlled environments), despite the introduction of positive 
switching costs by these modifications. The following two propositions regarding the effect of IP policies are advanced 
Proposition 6 – Intellectual property policies cannot help identify or prevent the manipulation of vertical standards to 
generate positive switching costs by supply-side organizations. 
Proposition 7 – Intellectual property policies cannot protect any end-user organization from the introduction of positive 
switching costs from vertical standard extensions deemed useful to the organization. 
Since modifications to vertical standards for internal purposes do not affect the contents of the original vertical standard, why 
should organizations be concerned about compatibility manipulation? A simple answer lies with the extent to which the 
vertical standard has to be extended to provide needed business functionality to the firm, and the importance of the 
functionality gap between the vertical standard and the business needs of potential adopters. In this case, full participation of 
industry members in the development stage for the vertical standard becomes critical. However, full participation may lead to 
fragmentation of efforts (Markus et al. 2006), which will have a negative effect on the diffusion of the finished standard. 
Thus, it is perhaps more important to the SDOs which sponsor vertical standards to curb the introduction of widespread 
modifications to the standard, or to act resolutely to ensure they are covered by the scope of the standard. The former case is 
impractical, if not impossible, due to the business value individual firms will find in the bridging capabilities of vertical 
standards technologies described earlier. The latter case, extending the scope of the vertical standard, may endanger the focus 
of the standard and result in an unnecessarily complex standard that does not meet industry needs. This kind of suboptimal 
development has caused vertical standard failures in energy markets (Wareham et al. 2005), and in the automotive (Gerst & 
Bunduchi 2005) and financial services industries (Chang & Jarvenpaa 2005). Thus, we propose that 
Proposition 8 – The magnitude of positive switching costs introduce by the manipulation of compatibility of vertical 
standards will be a direct function of the perceived functionality gap between the standard and the business needs of potential 
adopters. 
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Lima, Peru,  August 12-15, 2010. 4 
Mendoza  Abstract Compatibility Standards and Switching Costs 
VULNERABILITY TO MANIPULATION OF COMPATIBILITY 
A number of conditions may lead to the differences described in the above propositions. Some of these conditions are 
described below. Evidence for the existence of any of these conditions does not guarantee that vertical standards will be 
manipulated to introduce positive switching costs, but proof of the existence of these conditions should alert SDOs to 
increase their vigilance to prevent manipulation by supply-side organizations participating in the development activities of 
vertical standards sponsored by the SDO. Additionally,  
Participation imbalances 
Much higher levels of participation from the supply side (vendors) than from the demand side (end-user or adopter 
organizations) of an SDO's membership may position vendors well to drive standards development in a direction that favors 
their incumbent competitive position. By their nature, vertical standards development is supposed to be driven by end-users 
(Nickerson & Muehlen 2003), and much greater vendor participation in development activities signals something different 
from what is intended. It must be kept in mind that vendors do not participate in the development of vertical standards 
because they wish to adopt them to meet business needs, but because they have a vested interest in supplying the resulting 
market. 
Investment imbalances 
In a similar vein, vendor investment in SDO activities that is significantly higher from end-user investment signals that 
vendors are actively positioning themselves to take advantage of the resulting market. Vendors see expenditures in 
development activities as investments, but because of the public-goods (Olson 1971) nature of vertical standards, end-user 
organizations are likelier to see any investment in development activities as a burden they would prefer someone else to 
carry. This can result in a risky lack of expertise with the vertical standard for end-user firms, whereas vendors making this 
investment can benefit from knowing (and perhaps influencing) the direction of the standards development. 
Knowledge Barriers 
The ability to identify opportunities afforded by new information or technology is a function of previous related expertise 
(Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Organizations with little previous expertise in vertical standards technologies may be likelier to 
cede technical leadership to vendors with this expertise and the desire to expend resources in development activities. 
Participation and investment imbalances may contribute to the development of higher knowledge barriers for end-user firms 
than for vendors later on. 
Legacy Technology Investment 
High levels of legacy technology investment may induce organizations to try to protect it, and the ease with which XML and 
other vertical standards technologies provide bridging capabilities to continue exploiting this investment may provide ample 
incentive to introduce extensive customization. With this customization, end-user organizations may introduce path 
dependencies (Arthur 1994) that will results in positive switching costs later on. Farrell & Saloner (1992) find that when 
converters are costless and perfect, their value to the organization is maximized, but the introduction of converters that may 
prevent a firm from adopting vertical standards later on may prove costlier to the firm. 
Given that intent will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove, perhaps the best that can be hoped for is to find evidence of the 
conditions that may lead to compatibility manipulation. While empirical evidence of significant differences between supply-
side and demand-side organizations along the dimensions just described can be obtained, they are not a guarantee that the 
differences will result in the introduction of positive switching costs by vendors or anyone else. The contextual nature of 
development of extensions to vertical standards means that actual evidence of manipulation has to be obtained on a case-by-
case basis, using the case study methodology. 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The conjectures and propositions described in this paper need to be tested empirically  in several settings (industries and their 
respective vertical standards). It is quite possible that manipulation of vertical standards in some industries will not lead to the 
introduction of positive switching costs, and it is important to tease out which additional effects not described in this paper 
may lead to that result. Also, identifying the existence of switching costs and quantifying their magnitude properly will be a 
difficult task, one which is likely to be highly contextual, and will require that qualitative research be conducted. Lastly, the 
signs of vulnerability described in the previous section may lead to directly testable hypotheses, or may simply form the basis 
for developing arguments in support of testable hypotheses. Additional theoretical refinement of this work is on-going, and 
any resulting hypotheses will be tested against an existing  data set which measures some of the concepts described here, and 
several others. 
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CONCLUSION 
Standards for physical products can be manipulated to introduce positive switching costs for adopting organizations (Chen & 
Forman 2006). This manipulation can lead to adoption inefficiencies, increased market fragmentation, and lower industry-
wide compatibility. Vertical standards are purely abstract compatibility standards, and it is not understood how, or whether, 
the introduction of extensions to manipulate vertical and horizontal compatibility for vertical standards results in positive 
switching costs for end-user firms. 
Vendor behavior may significantly influence the development of vertical standards, and existing research suggests 
development-stage dilemmas are linked tightly with diffusion stage problems (Markus et al. 2006). Imbalances in vendor 
participation and investment in development activities may have important implications for vendors, adopter organizations, 
and SDOs. Vendors may be able to influence vertical standards development to preserve incumbent competitive advantages, 
while end-users may be left with greater dependence on vendor expertise. SDOs need to understand the conditions under 
which their standards may be subject to manipulation, and whether the effect of this manipulation is harmless or noxious to 
industry-compatibility objectives. While vendors willingly submit to standards for physical products like routers and switches 
(Chen & Forman 2006), vertical standards are purely abstract products, and the effect of vendor intervention is still unclear 
on this kind of product. 
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